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 ABSTRACT 
INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER FOR  
ERADICATING CHILD LABOR: INDONESIA PROGRAM KELUARGA HARAPAN 
 
By 
Hwang, Miae 
 
 The study aimed to analyze whether subsidies from the Indonesian conditional cash 
transfer program were successful in reducing the participation of children in the labor force. 
One of the expected effects of conditional cash transfers is reducing child labor by making 
children affordable to spend more time in school instead of the work place. However, the 
Indonesian conditional cash transfer program, Program Keluarga Harapan, did not improve 
child labor significantly. To figure out the reasons for this failure, this study conducted a 
financial analysis of children who are participating in the program by using the Indonesia 
Family Life Survey data from the RAND Corporation and Indonesian statistical data. The 
results demonstrated that the amount of subsidy was too low to make children go to school, 
driving children to choose to work instead of studying; hence, reducing educational 
expenditure or increasing subsidies by incorporating scholarship is required. Furthermore, 
when the study compared program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries with future scenarios, 
the results showed that not participating in the program would be better for children who 
already have dropped out of the school. On the other hand, it illustrated that acquiring a 
diploma is important once they start studying in school. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose of This Study 
The purpose of this study is to find out why Indonesian conditional cash transfer 
program, Program Keluarga Harapan, failed to reduce child labor in Indonesia and to 
suggest how we can reduce child labor by maximizing the effects of the program. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Program 
Generally, conditional cash transfer is one of the ways to deal with the child labor 
issue. The government or other sectors provides money to a household when family 
members send children to school, and increasing school enrollment leads to a decrease of 
child labor since children cannot work while they are studying. The Indonesian government 
also implemented a conditional cash transfer program called Program Keluarga Harapan 
(PKH). 
However, many evaluation papers such as Main Findings from the Impact Evaluation 
of Indonesia’s Pilot Household Conditional Cash Transfer Program written by Alatas in 
2011, mentioned that the program did not improve children from very poor households 
school enrollment and did not reduce their waged labor significantly. At 95%, the 
elementary school enrollment rate in Indonesia was already high, but it did not lead to a 
meaningful decrease in waged labor working hours, since school drop-out rates were still 
high. About 20% of Indonesian primary or junior-high school students, approximately 
750,000, dropped out from school in 20101. 
                                          
1 Tifa, A. (2011, January 3). Education Ministry targets reduction in drop-out rate. The 
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1.3 Importance of This Issue 
Considering human rights and economic development, dealing with the child labor 
problem is important. First, child labor causes children’s health problems. It is noteworthy 
to mention that Indonesian children still work in hazardous conditions and unsafe 
environments where elements like inflammable and gaseous gear, toxic chemicals, 
dangerous heights, and perilous machinery and equipment severely threaten children’s lives 
(Aldobrandini 2012). Without a doubt, eradicating child labor, especially the worst form of 
child labor in Indonesia, is a truly global and important issue. 
Second, child labor disturbs economic development in the long-term. This is due to the 
fact that the accumulation of human capital is a key factor of economic development in the 
long run. Human capital investment in the fields of education and health are especially 
important since they have a positive relationship with productivity (Galli 2001). However, 
children cannot be educated because of the work they are required to do. The working 
hours of children in Indonesia are above the standard level, which means that they have no 
time to go to school. Even though they can enroll in schools, they do not have a sufficient 
amount of time to do homework, or the physical strength to simultaneously perform study 
and work. This unfortunate phenomenon can cause low productivity and affect the 
domestic economy in the long term. Therefore, eradicating child labor is crucial for 
personal and national development. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
Jakarta post. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/03/education-
ministry-targets-reduction-dropout-rate.html. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
To eradicating child labor, we need to find why children keep working. Many literature 
reviews mentioned that main reasons of child labor were related to economic problems. 
Therefore, this study also assume that conditional cash transfer is insufficient for children’s 
living standards and expenditures, so they decide to work instead of participating in the 
program. To illustrate this, the study will see two hypotheses, 1) H1: Net revenue of 
participants in the program is lower than that of non-participants and 2) H1: Net Present 
Value (NPV), i.e., the present value of net benefit, of participating in the program is lower 
than NPV of not participating in the program. For calculations, program’s subsidy, 
children’s average income, education expenditure and expected average income based on 
educational achievement will be used for analysis. 
This paper is organized in 5 chapters and a literature review on child labor, education, 
and conditional cash transfers will be introduced in Chapter 2. In chapter 3, the 
methodology and data used for the analysis will be discussed, followed by chapter 4 which 
will show the results of the analysis of data concerning children’s net benefits from 
participating in and not participating in the program. Chapter 5 will discuss summaries of 
findings, program suggestions, and the conclusion. 
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2.  Literature Review 
 
Program Keluarga Harapan, the definition of child labor, conditional cash transfers, 
the current child labor situation in Indonesia, as well as the effects of conditional cash 
transfers on education and child labor will be reviewed in this chapter prior to addressing 
methodology and data. 
 
2.1 Program Keluarga Harapan 
Program Keluarga Harapan has been implemented since 2007 in 5 provinces. By 2012, 
it was expanded to 25 out of 33 provinces with 118 districts targeted and about 778,000 
households participating in the program led by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Kemensos.  
[Figure 1] Map of PKH Areas2 
Like other cash transfer programs, Program Keluarga Harapan aims to mitigate 
                                          
2 World Bank 20122  
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household poverty in the short-term, while improving human capital investment by 
increasing school enrollment and improving health conditions of children and pregnant 
women in the long term. The provision of subsidies requires the fulfillment of the 
following conditions: for pregnant women, they must take iron supplements and visit an 
office for post-natal care; for children aged less than 6 years, they must complete 
immunization and regularly receive health checks; and for children aged 6 to 15 years, they 
must achieve 85% school attendance. The amount of subsidy is IDR 800,000 per year for 
children aged less than 6 years, and pregnant women. Primary school students (age 7-12) 
receive IDR 600,000 per year, while secondary school students (age 13-15) receive IDR 
1,000,000 per year. Since the fixed and base transfer is IDR 200,000, the remaining amount 
of transfer varies, depending on the age of the targeted population joining the program. The 
minimum value of subsidies is IDR 600,000, and the government limited the transfer up to 
IDR 2,200,000 as the maximum transfer regardless of the number of children per 
household. 
  In 2011, 4 years since the program started, the World Bank set indicators, such as 
poverty level of beneficiaries, child malnutrition level, consumption of high-energy and 
high-protein food, average education attainment level, attendance rate of children, the 
number of children’s working hours, and the rate of children’s work participation, in order 
to evaluate this CCT program (Alatas 2011). Surprisingly, most of the indicators improved 
compared to the baseline, but the number of working hours and the rate of work 
participation indicated that the program did not mitigate child labor. According to the 
results, program participants, especially aged 7-12 years old, decreased waged work 
(during the last month) by only 0.6%. The paper mentioned that the results can be caused 
by insufficient subsidies and absence of timely distribution of subsidies for children during 
6 
their transition to higher grades. 
 
2.2 Definition of Child Labor 
The Indian Child Labor Act [1986]3 defines a child as “Any person who has not 
completed his fourteenth year of age”, so work of children whose ages are under 14 years old 
is regarded as child labor. UNICEF defines child labor as when a child is “…involved in 
child labor activities under the following classification: (a) children 5 to 11 years of age that 
during the week preceding the survey did at least one hour of economic activity or at least 28 
hours of domestic work, and (b) children 12 to 14 years of age that during the week preceding 
the survey did at least 14 hours of economic activity or at least 42 hours of economic activity 
and domestic work combined”.4 The ILO defines ‘Child labor’ as “work that deprives 
children of their childhood, their potential and dignity, and that is harmful to their physical 
and mental development”.5 The word ‘work’ used in the aforementioned definition refers to 
work that is “mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children, and 
interferes with their schooling by depriving them of the opportunity to attend school, obliging 
them to leave school prematurely, or requires  them to attempt to combine school attendance 
with excessively long hours and heavy work. 
In this paper, ‘child labor’ will be defined as children whose ages are between 7 years 
old and 15 years old working more than one hour per week, since in Indonesia all children are 
                                          
3 The Child labor act is enacted in India and it prevents children whose ages are below 14 
years old from working. The act was revised in 2000, and 2009. 
4 UNICEF. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/stats_popup9.html. 
5 ILO. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/index.htm. 
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required to attend school and complete the junior-secondary schooling. 
 
2.3Indonesian Child Labor 
    The paper is based on an Indonesian program, so the following reviews have to do with 
child labor in Indonesia, how many children work in Indonesia, what the motivation for 
working is, what kind of areas they work in, and what the impact on education is. 
 According to a UCW report (2012), Indonesian children who work, irrespective of 
the kinds of tasks they perform, were estimated to have been 6.7 percent of the child 
population or 2.3 million children in 2009. The main reason for child labor is based on the 
economic situation. Krisztina Kis-katos and Gunther G. Schulze (2010), Priyambadam, et al. 
(2005), Amin, et al. (2004) claimed that children’s income, which is typically crucial for 
household survival, gives way to the increasing supply of child labor. Income shock and 
unemployment of adults also increases the demand of child labor since children could make 
up for the loss from income shock by working. Similarly, unemployment of adults and the 
supply of child labor have a positive relationship. Children are increasingly expected to work 
when one of the adults in the family loses his or her job or does not have the opportunity to 
work. Similarly, Priya Ranjan’s (1999) study supports this idea in another way. He found that 
formal credit markets, especially long-term credit markets, are desperately needed to make 
children go to school. For the poor, a loan is the easiest way to acquire assets. Unfortunately, 
it is difficult for the impoverished to have that opportunity since there is nothing that 
guarantees their credit. Therefore, they send their children not to school but to work. 
 Central Board of Statistics (BPS) & ILO-IPEC (2010) mentioned that about 57.2 
percent of working children aged between 5 and 17 are employed in agriculture, forestry, 
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hunting, and fishery. In the agriculture sector, children especially work at plantations where 
they produce rubber, palm oil, and tobacco. Such occupations are hazardous to children since 
there are many factors that may possibly harm the children. These working conditions can 
easily harm and disable the children. Also, working affects the children’s education. 
Argrist and Lavy (2009), Fiszbein and Shady (2009), Hnushek, et al. (2008), and 
Glewwe and Kremer (2006) repeatedly illustrated that child labor induces children to quit 
their schooling. They found that when children’s income, which can be understood as an 
opportunity cost to children in school, rises; the school dropout rates also increase. Since 
older children and boys tend to get higher salaries, the school drop-out rates of boys and 
children aged 11-13 is also higher. Even though working children succeed in continuing their 
schooling, the Aldobrandini (2012) showed that working children are less likely to attend 
school than non-working children, and, needless to say, working hours and school attendance 
had a strong and negative relationship. Considering that the average working hours of 
children is about 24.2 hours in a week, working children have less time to study, so their 
highest attained grade is lower than non-working children and they therefore typically drop 
out of school (Aldobrandini 2012). 
To deal with the problem, the Indonesian government tried to increase school 
enrollment and reduce child labor by supporting poor households through many programs. 
 
[Table 1] Governmental Program for Reducing Child Labor and Education 
Name Type Year 
Programme Bantuan Tunai Unconditional Cash Transfer 
Program 
2005 
Programme Keluarga Harapan Conditional Cash Transfer 2007 
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Program 
Generasi Sehatdan Cerdas Community CCT Program 2007 
Raskin Rice Subsidy Program 2006 
Urban Poverty Program - 1998 
Kecamatan Development Program - 1998 
Programme Nasional Pemberdayan 
Masyarakat 
National Program for 
Community Empowerment 
2006 
 
 
2.4School Enrollment, Child labor and Conditional Cash Transfer 
 Under the Conditional Cash Transfer review, the definition of Conditional Cash 
Transfers and their impact on school enrollment, and child labor will be explained.  
 The Conditional Cash Transfer program (CCT) is a program offering cash to poor 
families and it comes to the fore as one of the effective ways for eradicating child labor. 
Originally, CCT programs were designed to increase children’s school enrollment (attendance) 
and to enhance household members’ health by muting household poverty. CCT usually 
requires family members to go to health centers for regular health checkups and children to 
go to school with at least 85% attendance. The impact of CCT is substantial, Deon Filmer and 
Norbert Schady (2009) mentioned that about 29 countries including Brazil, Mexico, 
Cambodia, and Ecuador have implemented CCT. 
For example, a study by Deon Filmer and Norbert Schady (2011) on Cambodia’s 
CCT Program called CESSP Scholarship Program (CSP) demonstrates a positive relationship 
between CCT and school enrollment. The program distributed $45 per year to each household 
which is equal to 2 or 3% of household expenditure. The improvement in school drop-out 
rates was about 25% compared to the non-beneficiaries whose school completion rate was 
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only 44%. Opptoruds (the CCT program in Mexico) showed similar outcomes. Alain de 
Janvry, et al. (2006), LB Rawlings and GM Rubio (2005), and Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth 
Sadoulet (2004) focused on the impact of the program. Households enrolled in the program 
received subsidies depending on the number of children and not surprisingly, results in 
children education were significant. Without the program, just 36% of the students enrolled 
in secondary school, but this figure increased to 76%. 
Additionally, CCT reduces child labor as an indirect benefit. Increasing school 
enrollment implies that children who work or do nothing start to go to school. For working 
children, the time for working is replaced by time spent in school so it obviously reduces 
child labor. Nicola Jones and Eliana Villar Marquez (2014), Fernand Ferandez and Victor 
Saldarriaga (2014) and Elizaveta Perova and Penosvakis (2009) illustrated that CCT shrinks 
child labor. In Peru, the Juntos (which means “together”) Program was implemented and its 
influence extended to paid and unpaid working children. Once per two months, a treatment 
group received 200 Soles ($63) and the result calculated from Young Lives data in 2009 
showed that the paid working children in a beneficiary group were 10 times less than those in 
a non-beneficiary group. Lorraine Dearden, et al. (2009) also proved the positive relationship 
between CCT and child labor. Unlike the Juntos Program, Education Maintenance Allowance 
in the United Kingdom reduced child labor by preventing inactive children from becoming 
workers. The program transferred subsidies corresponding to 12% of household income to 
families earning less than £ 13,000. The scholarship value was enlarged for full-time students 
by 6.7%. 
However, in some cases it appears that the poorest household children do not follow 
the general outcome. Even though they could get the subsidy by going to school and get more 
labor earnings in the future, they chose work instead of studying. Dimo, et al. (2013) 
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illustrated this phenomenon with a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) done in China. The 
project randomly selected people in a village and gave them 500 RMB. Contrary to a control 
group which had 13.3%working children, the treatment group had only 5.3% working 
children, showing an 8% difference. However, it was not significant to the poorest children 
group. The study found that they were usually working at off-farm jobs and earned 100RMB 
per month. To them, participating in that program causes damages to their household 
economy. Eric V. Edmonds A., and Maheshwor Shrestha (2014) focused on children’s 
opportunity cost showing the Nepal CCT Program case. They argued that even though it 
reduced working girls in weaving by 75% and prevented them from failing school exams by 
66%, the researchers could not find net returns to education, stressing that foregone child 
labor earnings should have been considered.  
The reviews illustrated that impact of CCT not always equally effects to all 
household. For the poorest household children, subsidy from the participating in the CCT 
program does not cover schooling expenditure so they tend to not go to school but to work. 
This phenomenon can be one of the reasons of failing CCT in Indonesia. Even though many 
evaluation on Indonesia CCT program, Programme Keluarga Harapan, showed the impact of 
the program, but there was no paper mentioned on opportunity cost of participating in 
program. They just mentioned that the inappropriately designed subsidy distribution time 
may failed to increased school enrollment in secondary school and reducing working children 
in that age. Therefore, this paper will examine whether financial transfer covers living 
expenses for educational expenditure and is higher than minimum living costs in the short-
term. Also, in the long-term, the study will check whether NPV of participating in the 
program is higher than NPV of not participating in the program. For participants, subsidies 
from the program, their reduced income as a result of less working hours (because of 
12 
schooling), and higher expected income by acquiring diploma will be regarded as revenues, 
while educational expenditure and living costs are regarded as expenditures. For non-
participants, their current income from full-time child labor and their expected income lower 
than that of educated children are considered as revenues, and only cost of living is their 
expenditure.    
Next chapter will introduce what methodology and data will be used for the proving 
hypothesis. 
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3. Methodology and Data 
 
From the literature reviews which mentioned that high opportunity cost is the one of 
the important barriers to participating in the program, and it was concluded that the 
insignificant results of PKH on education and child labor also were caused by high 
opportunity costs of participating in the PKH and attending school. To verify such 
assumption, the study will examine whether or not participating in the PKH incurs high 
opportunity costs by calculating private returns of participating in the PKH using private 
financial analyses. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
To determine the opportunity cost, two hypotheses will be examined. 
1) H0: Net revenue of participating in the program is higher than or same with that of 
non-participating children 
H1: Net revenue of participating in the program is lower than that of non-participating 
children. 
 
2) H0: NPV of children participating in the program is higher than or same with the NPV 
of non-participants in the program. 
H1: NPV of children participating in the program is lower than NPV of non-
participants in the program. 
14 
 
To compare the revenue and expenditure of participating in the program, this study 
categorizes the children into groups. Children who are currently enrolled in school face a 
decision of whether to continue to studying while receiving the subsidy (participating in PKH) 
or to start full-time work while giving up schooling (not participating in PKH). Children are 
divided into 6 groups. The first 4 groups are comprised of children participating in the PKH, 
while the others include children not participating in PKH since we do not know at what time 
a child will be forced to decide to study or work. 
 [Table 2] Group of Children participating in PKH 
 
Age Participate in PKH 
Attend to 
Primary 
school 
Finish 
Primary 
school 
Attend to  
Junior-high 
school 
Finish 
Junior-high 
school 
A 7 - 12 O O O X X 
B 7 – 12 O O O O X 
C 7 – 12 O O O O O 
D 13 - 
15 
O O O O O 
 
[Table 3] Group of Children not participating in PKH 
 
Age Participate in PKH 
Attend to 
Primary 
school 
Finish 
Primary 
school 
Attend to 
Junior-high 
school 
Finish 
Junior-high 
school 
E 7 - 12 X X X X X 
F 13 - 15 X O O  X 
 
The groups are categorized as follows: 
A. Children whose ages are between 7 -12 and participate in the PKH. They attend 
15 
primary school and finish even though the program subsidy is provided for only 4 years. 
However, they do not continue schooling after completing primary education. 
B. Children whose ages are between 7 -12 and participate in the PKH. They attend 
primary school, finish and enroll in junior-high school even though the program subsidy 
is only provided for 4 years. However, they do not complete secondary school.   
C. Children whose ages are between 7 -12 and participate in the PKH. They attend 
primary school, finish it and attend junior-high school until they complete secondary 
schooling, even though the program subsidy is only provided for 4 years.  
D. Children whose ages are between 13 -15 and participate in the PKH. They attend 
junior-high school up to completion. 
E. Children whose ages are between 7 -12 and not participate in the PKH. They do not 
experience schooling and have no plan to. 
F. Children whose ages are between 13 -15 and participate in the PKH. They have 
already acquired a primary school diploma even though they are not enrolled now.  
  For the analysis, this study will calculate the net revenue of participating in the 
program on short-term (5 years), Mid-term (10 years) and long-term (until retiring age) 
bases. The classifications of these periods are as follows: 
a) Calculate until 20 years old, which is 5 years from the age of 156. 
b) Calculate until 25 years old, which is 10 years from the age of 15. 
                                          
615 years old that ILO set as minimal age for work will be the starting point. 
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c) Calculate until 60 years old, which is the average retirement age. 
However, the starting point of the calculation will vary since children can start the 
program in any age as mentioned above. Therefore, we will not consider previous 
educational expenditure, expenditure before the program, because such expenditures are 
sunk costs.  
To estimate the NPV and net revenue of participating or not participating in the PKH, 
subsidy, current income, expected income and education expenditure will be used.  
 
[Table 4] Variables of Children participating in PKH 
Income Subsidy, Current income, Expected income 
Expenditure   Education expenditure, Cost of living 
 
[Table 5] Variables of Children not participating in PKH 
Income Current income, Expected income 
Expenditure Cost of living 
 
3.2 Data 
Data of child labor income and education expenditure in Indonesia are taken from the 
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 4 which was done by RAND Corporation in 2007. 
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) has been implemented once every 4 years and it covers 
only 13 of the 27 provinces in Indonesia. Nevertheless, using it is reasonable since surveyed 
areas cover PKH areas and 83% of Indonesians live in those 13 provinces. Educational 
expenditure contained not only primary and secondary schools but Islamic schools as well, 
while child labor income only contained general (none religious) elementary schools and 
17 
general (none religious) junior-high schools, since samples of Islamic schools were too small 
to use as they were only 8. To avoid double counting, the study deducted cost of living from 
the educational expenditure. Children participating in the program also work for a part-time 
job (11.6 hours per week), while non-participants work for a full-time job (24.2 hours per 
week) (Aldobrandini 2012). Therefore, the study added the current income from both 
participants and non-participants into the calculation.  
Information on the program subsidy was taken from the social assistance program 
and public expenditure review 6 on PKH conditional cash transfers written by the World 
Bank in 2012. Children whose age are 7-12 receives IDR 60,000 per year while children 
whose age are 13-15 receive IDR 1,000,000 per year. Expected income and living cost were 
taken from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS-Statistics Indonesia). However, a child’s living costs 
were derived from 2/3 of the cost of living per capita which does not capture expenditures on 
education; the reason for using 2/3 of the cost of living is that a child spends less than an 
adult does. To establish expected income, average income based on educational achievement 
was used instead of using life time earnings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
4. Analysis 
 
4.1 Net revenue and Subsistence Income 
 During the period in which children participate in the program for 4 years, the total 
net revenue of participating in the program showed negative figures. Even though they 
received subsidy, they spent a lot of money on education, and their earnings also declined 
because of shortened working hours.  
[Table 6] Net Revenue of Participating in PKH 
 [Unit: IDR] 
  
PRIMARY SCHOOL 
CHILDREN 
JUNIOR-HIGH 
SCHOOL CHILDREN 
  Participants
Non-
Participants Participants 
Non-
Participants
COST Educational Expenditure 1,248,172  2,303,791  
 Cost of Living 2,738,104 2,738,104 2,738,104 2,738,104 
BENEFITS Subsidy 600,000 - 1,000,000 - 
 
Current 
Income 1,219,115 2,543,326 1,327,914 2,770,303 
TOTAL  -2,167,161 -194,778 -2,713,981 32,199 
 
In Table 6, the net revenue of participants is lower than that of non-participants. The 
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participants who are in primary school and receive a subsidy have a negative net revenue 
which is -2,167,161 while that of children who are in junior-high school and receive 
subsidy is -2,713,981. Also, participant’s net revenue will go worse since subsidy is only 
provided for 4 years so they need to endure some schooling periods without any subsidy.  
 
 The subsidy and current income cannot cover educational expenditure since 
educational expenditure is about twice the amount of subsidy, and subsidy alone is too low 
to cover such expenditure. Although program participants also work, their income is not as 
large as that of full-time working children. The amount of their income can barely cover 
their educational expenditure, but cannot cover the cost of living. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the study can conclude that the net revenue of participants is 
lower than that of non-participants. 
 
4.1.1 Increasing Subsidy Scenarios 
4.1 shows that the subsidy is too low to cover educational expenditures. In other 
words, educational expenditures were high so subsidy and current income cannot pay off 
that expenditure. In subsidy scenarios, the study tried to find how much the subsidy 
should be increased to pay off the expenditure by making scenarios when subsidy 
increases by 20% and 50%. 
 
4.1.1.1Increasing by 20% 
When subsidy increases by 20%, children who are eligible for primary school will get 
IDR 72,000 per year while children who are eligible for secondary school will get IDR 
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12,000,000 per year.  
However, still the increased subsidy does not compensate educational expenditure. Table 
7 shows that the net revenues of children who participate in the program are IDR -2,047,161 
and IDR - 2,513,981 each for children the age of 7-12 and 13-15. Still, participating in the 
program will result in negative net revenue during the schooling periods even though subsidy 
increased about 120% from the original subsidy. 
[Table 7] Subsidy 20%_Net Revenue of Participating in PKH 
 [Unit: IDR] 
  PRIMARY SCHOOL 
JUNIOR-HIGH 
SCHOOL 
  Participants
Non-
Participants Participants 
Non-
Participants
COST Educational Expenditure 1,248,172  2,303,791  
 Cost of Living 2,738,104 2,738,104 2,738,104 2,738,104 
BENEFITS Subsidy 720,000 - 1,200,000 - 
 
Current 
Income 1,219,115 2,543,326 1,327,914 2,770,303 
TOTAL  - 2,047,161 - 194,778 - 2,513,981 32,199 
 
4.1.1.2 Increasing by 50% 
When subsidy increases by 50%, subsidy will increased by IDR 72,000 per year for 
primary school student while it is increased by IDR 15,000,000 per year for secondary school 
student. Unfortunately, increased subsidy still could not cover the expenditure and let 
children get lower net revenue than non-participants who may get IDR - 194,778 and IDR 
32,199 as their net revenue. Table 8 shows children whose age is 7-12 will get IDR -
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1,867,161 per year and children whose age is 13- 15 will get IDR -2,213,981 per year as a net 
revenue, and all figures are negative. When I calculated the subsidy untie it cover the whole 
expenditure, it was revealed that subsidy should be increased by 500% during the schooling 
periods. 
 
 
[Table 8] Subsidy 50%_Net Revenue of Participating in PKH 
[Unit: IDR] 
  PRIMARY SCHOOL 
JUNIOR-HIGH 
SCHOOL 
  Participants
Non-
Participants Participants 
Non-
Participants
COST Educational Expenditure 1,248,172  2,303,791  
 Cost of Living 2,738,104 2,738,104 2,738,104 2,738,104 
BENEFITS Subsidy 900,000 - 1,500,000 - 
 
Current 
Income 1,219,115 2,543,326 1,327,914 2,770,303 
TOTAL  -1,867,161 -194,778 -2,213,981 32,199 
 
 
4.2Comparing NPVs of Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries  
When comparing the NPVs of participating in the program and not participating in 
the program, the results were different depending on periods and the starting age of the 
program. Table 9 compares beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries in the short-term. After 5 
years from the age of 15, the age of finishing mandatory education, the results show that all 
NPVs of the children who participated in the program, except for children who started the 
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program at 11 and 12 years old in group A, children who started the program at the age of 
12 in group B, and those in group D (marked by underline), were less than NPVs of non-
participants. This phenomenon is due to the expensive educational expenditure. Even 
though the government designed a subsidy that covered tuition, they did not consider 
transportation fees and other costs like uniforms, school supplies and the related 
expenditures. The amount of educational expenditures was about twice the amount of the 
children’s current income, so offsetting that expenditure requires a lot of time. However, 
group D is different. The expected income of children with a secondary school diploma is 
significantly higher than the expected income of children with a primary school diploma, so 
this enables children in group D to have a higher NPV than children in group F. 
Table 10 shows the children’s NPV after 10 years from the age of 15. It still shows 
that most of the children who did not participate in the program will have higher NPVs than 
those in the treatment groups. However, the NPVs associated with children who started the 
program at the age of 10 in group A, children aged 12 years old in group B, and children 
above 10 years old in group C become higher than NPVs of non-participants. Especially, 
group B and group C have children who finished their primary or secondary schooling. 
This result supports that children who joined the program at later ages of schooling will get 
advantage on having higher NPVs than the counter groups (Group E and F) because they 
do not need to spend a lot on education until they graduate from the school. 
Finally, children’s NPVs after 45 years from the age of 15 show that most of the 
children who participated in the program will get higher NPVs than those who did not 
participate in the program. Regardless of program starting ages, children who finished 
junior-high school, representing all children in group C and D, have higher NPVs than non-
participants do. This shows that the expected income for secondary school graduates is 
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significantly high enough to catch up non-participants’ benefits even though they covered 
educational expenditures and cost of living. NPVs of children under 9 years old in group A 
and under 11 years old in group B are still lower than those of non-participants. When 
comparting those, however, children in group A will get more advantage of having higher 
NPVs than those in group B because children in group B spent more educational 
expenditures (they covered not only primary schooling but also secondary schooling 
expenditures). This phenomena proved again that finishing schooling is much important for 
one’s benefits.  
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[Table 9] Comparing NPV_5 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
 Participating in Program Not Participating in Program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7 ‐      1,664,795    ‐      5,843,665    ‐      4,108,893                 5,661,971      
8                  
847,338   
‐      3,593,366    ‐      1,685,216                 6,442,424      
9           3,766,738    ‐      1,118,036                     
981,038   
             7,300,922      
10           6,527,289              1,905,352              4,214,333                 8,245,270      
11           9,665,540              5,231,079              7,770,959                 9,284,053      
12       13,015,971              8,138,064          11,683,246             10,426,714      
13                15,235,448             11,683,641   
14                19,744,372             12,816,586   
15                24,704,188             14,062,826   
 
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
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 [Table 10] Comparing NPV_10 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
 Participating in program Not participating in program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7           4,114,981    ‐                  63,890            3,833,174                 9,726,144      
8           7,205,091              2,764,387              7,051,030             10,913,014      
9       10,760,266              5,875,492          10,590,939             12,218,571      
10       14,220,170              9,598,233          14,785,225             13,654,684      
11       18,127,709          13,693,248          19,398,939             15,234,408      
12       22,324,357          17,446,450          24,474,025             16,972,105      
13                29,305,304             18,883,571   
14                35,221,214             20,736,509   
15                41,728,714             22,774,741   
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
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[Table 11] Comparing NPV_45 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
 Participating in program Not participating in program 
Starting age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7       13,245,228              9,066,358          16,379,169             16,146,272      
8       17,248,363          12,807,659          20,851,559             17,975,156      
9       21,807,866          16,923,091          25,771,593             19,986,927      
10       26,372,529          21,750,592          31,483,945             22,199,875      
11       31,495,304          27,060,843          37,767,531             24,634,119      
12       37,028,711          32,150,805          44,679,476             27,311,786      
13                54,939,065             30,257,221   
14                63,418,350             33,247,524   
15                72,745,565             40,660,252   
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4.2.1Increasing Subsidy Scenarios 
Like net revenue of participating in the program, original subsidy does not allow 
children who participating in the program get more NPVs than children who do not 
participating in the program. Therefore, the study also examined how much subsidy 
should be increase to allow beneficiaries get high NPVs. 
 
4.2.1.1Increasing by 20% 
In terms of comparing with the non-beneficiaries, the results were more significant 
than the base line. All NPVs of participating in the program increased by between IDR 
400,000 to IDR 500,000 from the base line. Even when the subsidy increases by 20%, the 
starting age of children in all groups whose NPVs are higher than those of non-
participants remain exactly the same. For example, increased subsidies for children who 
are aged 10 years old in group A in Table 9 could not allow them to have higher NPVs 
than non-participants.  
Table 13 shows that 10 years after reaching 15 years old, subsidies did lower the 
starting age of children who receive higher NPVs than non-participants; however, the 
increase of subsides by 20% resulted in the change of NPVs from negative to positive 
figures for children aged 7 years old in group B.  
When children work until their retirement, children starting the program at 10 years 
old now have higher NPVs than the counter groups due to the increased subsidies. 
Nevertheless, increased subsidies, 120% of base line subsidies, are not sufficient to make 
all participants have higher NPVs than non-beneficiaries.  
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[Table 12] Subsidy 20%_Comparing NPV_5 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
 Participating in program Not participating in program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7 ‐      1,246,372    ‐      5,425,243    ‐      3,690,471                 5,661,971      
8           1,265,761    ‐      3,174,943    ‐      1,266,794                 6,442,424      
9           4,185,161    ‐              699,614              1,399,460                 7,300,922      
10           6,855,554              2,383,880              4,692,861                 8,245,270      
11           9,894,631              5,775,722              8,315,602                 9,284,053      
12       13,135,971              8,605,172          12,300,617             10,426,714      
13                15,782,556             11,683,641   
14                20,126,190             12,816,586   
15                24,904,188             14,062,826   
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
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[Table 13] Subsidy 20%_Comparing NPV_10Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
 Participating in program Not participating in program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7           4,533,403                      354,533            4,251,596                 9,726,144      
8           7,623,514              3,182,810              7,469,453             10,913,014      
9       11,178,689              6,293,914          11,009,361             12,218,571      
10       14,548,435          10,076,761          15,263,752             13,654,684      
11       18,356,800          14,237,892          19,943,582             15,234,408      
12       22,444,357          17,913,558          25,091,395             16,972,105      
13                29,852,412             18,883,571   
14                35,603,032             20,736,509   
15                41,928,714             22,774,741   
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
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[Table 14] Subsidy 20%_Comparing NPV_45 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
 Participating in program Not participating in program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7       13,663,650              9,484,780          16,797,591             16,146,272      
8       17,666,785          13,226,082          21,269,981             17,975,156      
9       22,226,288          17,341,513          26,190,016             19,986,927      
10       26,700,794          22,229,120          31,962,472             22,199,875      
11       31,724,395          27,605,486          38,312,174             24,634,119      
12       37,148,711          32,617,912          45,296,846             27,311,786      
13                55,486,172             30,257,221   
14                63,800,169             33,247,524   
15                72,945,565             40,660,252   
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4.2.1.2Increasing by 50% 
 When subsidy increases by about 50%, NPVs are increased by about between IDR 
1,100,000 and IDR 1,600,000 (about 1.01 times) from the baseline. The number of 
beneficiary groups which can get higher NPVs than non-beneficiaries also increased. 
The Table 15, 16, and 17 show the similar results as the scenarios of remaining at the 
baseline and increasing subsidies by 20%. Until 5 years and 10 years, after starting to work in 
regular job market (15 years old), most of the NPVs of students in group A, B and C are 
smaller than those of children in group E and F. Only students in group D who started the 
program in junior-high school and finished their schooling could get higher NPVs than their 
counter group (group F). However, when comparing Table 11, 14, and 17 which calculated 
the NPVs of participants reaching the age of retirement, all children, except for 4 age groups 
(children aged 7 years old in group A and children aged 7, 8, and 9 years old in group B), 
now have higher NPVs than the control group. Children in the aforementioned 4 age groups 
still could not get the higher NPVs. Even though children starting the program at 10 years old 
in group B turned out to be having higher NPVs compared to those in the scenario of 
increasing subsidies by 20%, this results still verify that discontinuing schooling negatively 
affects children in their finance.   
From the increasing subsidy scenarios, the study could identify two important 
findings. First, educational expenditure is really expensive. Indonesian educational 
expenditure for primary school is slightly higher than reduced income of children whose ages 
are eligible to go to primary school. In terms of junior-high school students, their educational 
expenditure is about twice the amount of their income. Thus, high educational expenditures 
make children easily drop out of school.  
Second, the salary gap between people having a primary school diploma and those 
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having a secondary school diploma is huge, and thus, this again illustrates that continuing 
schooling until the completion of secondary school is important. Once children get diploma, 
all their negative revenues will be compensated in the near future, and they can also get 
higher income than others.
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[Table 15] Subsidy 50%_Comparing NPV_5 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
 
 Participating in program                   Not participating in program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7 ‐              618,739    ‐      4,797,609    ‐      3,062,838                 5,661,971      
8           1,893,394    ‐      2,547,310    ‐              639,160                 6,442,424      
9           4,812,794    ‐                  71,981            2,027,093                 7,300,922      
10           7,347,950              3,101,671              5,410,652                 8,245,270      
11       10,238,267              6,592,687              9,132,566                 9,284,053      
12       13,315,971              9,305,833          13,226,672             10,426,714      
13                16,603,217             11,683,641   
14                20,698,917             12,816,586   
15                25,204,188             14,062,826   
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
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[Table 16] Subsidy 50%_Comparing NPV_10 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
 Participating in program                   Not participating in program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7           5,161,036                      982,166            4,879,229                 9,726,144      
8           8,251,147              3,810,443              8,097,086             10,913,014      
9       11,806,322              6,921,548          11,636,994             12,218,571      
10       15,040,831          10,794,552          15,981,543             13,654,684      
11       18,700,436          15,054,856          20,760,547             15,234,408      
12       22,624,357          18,614,219          26,017,451             16,972,105      
13                30,673,073             18,883,571   
14                36,175,759             20,736,509   
15                42,228,714             22,774,741   
 
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
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[Table 17] Subsidy 50%_Comparing NPV_45 Years 
[Unit: IDR] 
 Participating in program                   Not participating in program 
Starting Age Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Group F 
7       14,291,284          10,112,413          17,425,225             16,146,272      
8       18,294,419          13,853,715          21,897,615             17,975,156      
9       22,853,921          17,969,147          26,817,649             19,986,927      
10       27,193,190          22,946,911          32,680,263             22,199,875      
11       32,068,031          28,422,451          39,129,139             24,634,119      
12       37,328,711          33,318,573          46,222,902             27,311,786      
13                56,306,833             30,257,221   
14                64,372,896             33,247,524   
15                73,245,565             40,660,252   
 
*Note: Underlined figures indicate that NPV of participating children will be greater than that of non-participating children 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 This study attempted to discover the main reason why children do not participate in 
the conditional cash transfer program (PKH), and found that high educational expenditures 
and low subsidies drive children to work instead of attending school. The educational 
expenditures of primary and junior-high school in Indonesia are about 2 times higher than 
program subsidies. Since most children work because of their low household income, they 
cannot afford the high costs of education. When children, especially children from the 
poorest households, continue to receive schooling, they may reduce their working hours 
instead of working full-time. Therefore, net revenues during the schooling periods are always 
negative, even though those losses can be recovered after they enter the job market. Under 
this situation, the cost of studying is, in effect, doubled because not only do they spend 
money on education they also forego earnings. This means that when children’s households 
cannot support this educational expenditure, or they require more earnings from their children, 
participating in the program is not a reasonable option for them. Therefore, the Indonesian 
government needs to increase the subsidy about 200% from the current subsidy.  
Moreover, we intuitively think that earnings tend to be different based on educational 
achievements, so enrollment in school is always expected to give highly educated people 
significantly more value than less-educated ones . However, finishing school is more 
important than just enrollment in school because some results show that children who start 
the program at an early age (participating at an early age means more educational expenditure 
is necessary) but do not finish their schooling get lower NPVs (i.e., group B) than those who 
do not attend school. Group A consisting of children who started the program when they were 
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of primary school age and achieved primary school diploma, Group C composed of children 
who studied until getting a junior-high school diploma, and Group D constituted by children 
who started the program when they entered junior-high school and successfully got a degree, 
illustrated that finishing their schooling allowed them to achieve higher NPVs than those who 
just gave up schooling. However, children in group B—students at ages eligible for primary 
school who finished their primary education but dropped out of schooling after their 
enrollment in secondary school—could not get higher NPVs compared to the other groups. 
Only children who joined the program when they are 11 and 12 years old in group B could 
have higher NPVs than non-beneficiaries. Once children finish secondary schooling, how 
much they spent on education is not a problem. Hence, the Indonesian government should 
encourage children to finish schooling to enable beneficiaries to get higher NPVs.  
The fundamental reason for this problem is that poor households cannot afford to live 
without children’s earnings. In addition, even though many parents are aware that the value 
of future earnings from educated children would be higher than the current earnings, they 
cannot support their children’s education with their current financial capacity; hence, they let 
their children work.  
Pertaining to eradicating child labor through the current CCT program, Program 
Keluarga Harapan, the Indonesian government should change its approach. Increasing 
subsidies until they meet educational expenditures is unrealistic. Instead, the government 
should redesign the program by not only increasing the subsidies by some amount, but also 
combining them with the current or new educational support for beneficiaries to reduce their 
economic burden. 
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